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Recent studies of conceptual capacities in primates point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys on
the one hand, and apes and humans on the other (Thompson & Oden, in press). The overall pattern of results
suggests that monkeys, but not apes and humans, might be best regarded as "paleo-logicans" in the sense that
they form class concepts on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). Their discrimination of
presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by
associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no compelling evidence that monkeys can perceive
relations-between-relations, let alone judge them as equivalent. Thus far, this conceptual capacity for analogi-
cal reasoning has been found only in chimpanzees and humans.
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I nterestingly, the "analogical ape", like thelchild, can make its analogical knowledge
explicit only if it is f irst acquires a language
or a symbol system by which propositional
representations can be encoded and mani-
pulated (e.9., Premack, 1983; Rattermann &
Gentner, 1998; Thompson & Oden. 1993,
'1996; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997;
Tyrrell, Stauffer and Snowman, 1991).
Language-naive chimpanzees and pre-
linguistic human infants perceive relations
(identity or nonidentity) to be the same or
different as measured by either visual gaze
or object handling in preference-for-novelty
tasks like 'paired-comparison' and 'habi-
tuation/ d ishabituation'. I nteresting ly, how-
ever, only those humans and chimpanzees
exposed to a regime of language or sym-
bolic token training can judge abstract
relations-between- relations as being the
same or different (cf., House, Brown & Scott,
1974; Premack, 1983; Sidman, 1994; Thomp-
son, et al., 1997). This judgmental capacity
is revealed in conceptual matching-to-
sample tasks. In this problem a chimpanzee
or child is correct if they match a pair of
shoes with a pair of apples, rather than to a
paired eraser and padlock. Likewise, they
are correct if they match the latter noniden-
tical pair with a paired cup and paper-
weight. The conceptual match i ng-to-sample
task can be conceived of as a non-linguistic
analogy problem involving a single abstract
relationship of same or different. Prior to
their exposure to language or analogous
symbolic token systems both humans and
chimpanzees fail to match one identity rela-
tion with another and to match one non-
identity relation with another (Oden, Thom-
pson, & Premack, 1990; Tyrrell, Zingaro, &
Minard, 1993).
These f indings imply that language or
symbol training does not instill propositional
knowledge about abstract relations of the
g
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type described above, but it does significan-
tly facilitate the explicit expression of such
knowledge and its breadth of construal in
equivalence judgment tasks. The implication
then is that experience with external symbol
structures and experience using them trans-
forms the shape of the computational spaces
that must be negotiated in order to solve
certain kinds of abstract problems. This
finding dovetails with the independent de-
monstration by Clark and Thornton (1997)
that standard connectionist learning by
artificial intelligent systems fail in exactly the
same class of tasks used with the child and
chimpanzee unless the net is provided with
some external guidance to simplify its repre-
sentational complexity.
Despite the provision of such 'external
means' via symbol training with tokens,
adult macaque monkeys 
- 
unlike chimpan-
zee or child 
- 
fail to judge the analogical
equivalence of relational stimulus pairs
despite their success at matching physically
identical objects. (Washburn, Thompson &
Oden, 1997; ms. in preparation). Why should
this be? Contrary to ape and child, adult and
infant macaque monkeys tested using the
same preference for novelty procedures are
perceptually insensitive to abstract equiva-
lencies of an analogical, and hence, propo-
sitional nature (Thompson & Oden in press).
These findings from comparative studies
imply that words or symbolic tokens enable
the representational re-coding of abstract
conceptual relations making them concrete
and salient. Symbols thereby significantly
facilitate a child's or chimpanzee's ability to
explicitly represent implicitly perceived
abstract properties of their world as con-
crete icons. Child or chimpanzee may then
use these icons to make explicit conceptual
judgments about those relations which they,
unlike monkeys, previously only perceived
implicitly early in life.
"Words and taxonomies often exert a
tyranny over thoughts. lf you have neither
a term nor a category for something, you
may not be able to see it 
- 
no matter how
largely or evidently it looms." (S. J. Gould,
The NYRB Oct 9, 1997).
"The use of symbols depends upon the
recognition of similarity, and not the
reverse." (Karl Lashley, 1929).
In the first of the above two quotes,
Steven J. Gould, the American paleontolo-
gist and essayist of natural history, proposes
that if one does not have a word, symbol or
category for "something" then a process as
basic as perceiving that "something" will
likely be impossible. An alternative hypo-
thesis is suggested in the second quotation.
The famous neuro- and physiological
psychologist Karl Lashley (1929) proposed
that the perception of similarity is a
necessary precursor of the ability to use a
symbolto denote the relation. An organism
must first perceive similarity in order to
apply a symbol to it.
Taken to its extreme, Gould's view
suggests that words are necessary for some
types of perception. This has in fact been
proposed in the famous Sapir-Whorf hypo-
thesis, which states that the grammatical
structure of a language shapes its speakers'
perception of the world (Sapir, 1921; Whorf,
1956). While a strong Whorfian position is
rarely adhered to today, the more moderate
Vygotskian view 
- 
that acquiring a lan-
guage confers the ability to direct one's own
mental processes and to formulate mental
plans has many proponents (Vygotsky,
1986). Each of these views, however, pro-
pose a direct link between symbols and
thought with the common theme being that
symbols are necessary to "see" the world
around you. Lashley's alternative proposal,
simply put, is that an organism must first
perceive the similarity in order to apply a
symbolto it.
As with many such "chicken or the egg"
questions, the answer is far more complex
than symbolto perception or perception to
symbol. Part of the complexity lies in who
or what is doing the perceiving. Not all per-
ceivers are human, nor are all perceivers
fully developed adult members of their spe-
cies. Thus, the interaction between percep-
tion and symbol may change in important
ways based on the population of interest.
Also important is what is being perceived.
t0
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Without denying either of the above
theoretical approaches, we offer here a
third position: Namely, symbols can be used
as tools that facilitate the extracting and
formulating of abstractions. ln this sense,
the acquisition of relational terms and
systems is instrumental in the development
of abstract thought (Gentner & Rattermann,
1991; see also Nelson, 1996).
ln this paper we will present examples of
symbols as Gould would have them: a
prerequisite for the ability to make explicit
judgements about relations and relational
similarity. We will also present evidence,
however, that is consistent with Lashley's
view of symbol use: the apriori ability to
implicitly perceive a relation is necessary in
order to use a symbol to denote that re-
lation. Finally, we will present our third
view, namely, that the use of symbols makes
explicit that which is implicitly perceived by
the individual. This view, which takes into
consideration evidence from both human
and non-human primates, is based on work
examining the perception and use of
relations and relational similarity. Although
this is not the only area in which implicit
knowledge is make explicit by the use of a
symbol, it is one that has been well studied
across species and therefore presents a
complete view of the interaction between
symbols and perception. Before laying out
these different views, we will first describe
several commonly used tasks that test
implicit and explicit relational knowledge in
both human and nonhuman primates.
lmplicit Tests for the Perception of
ldentity
The implicit perceptual capacities of both
prelinguistic human and nonhuman prima-
tes typically are inferred from tests of that
to which they spontaneously attend without
having to make an explicit instrumentally
governed judgment response. Tests that
measure the implicit perception of ldentity
often take advantage of a well-documented
preference for novelty exhibited by both
human and non-human primates. (Harris,
1943; Sokolov, 1963). The paired-comparison
and habituation/dishabituation tasks that
utilize this preference are widely in studies
of perception and cognitive development in
humans and nonhuman primates (e.g.,
Fagan, 1970; Fagan & Singer, '1983; Gun-
derson & Sackett, 1984; Gunderson & Swartz,
1986, Swartz, 1983). For example, in the
paired comparison task, subjects are first
given the opportunity to gaze at 
- 
or handle
a stimulus object or display through out the
trial of a fixed duration. Typically, cumula-
tive stimulus handling time 
- 
or visual
fixation on the stimulus is recorded as the
primary dependent variable. A second test
trial occurs after this initial familiarization
trial. On the second trial, also of fixed
duration, the now familiar stimulus is pre-
sented simultaneously with a novel stimulus
and the experimenters record the cumula-
tive attention (i.e., gaze or handling time)
paid to each stimulus throughout this second
comparison trial. One the one hand, if the
relative attention paid to each stimulus does
not differ significantly then one has no
evidence that the subject spontaneously
perceived the stimulito differ. On the other
hand, however, if the relative attention paid
to one stimulus 
-typically the novel stimulus
- 
differs significantly from that paid to the
other then experimenters infer that the
subject did in fact implicitly perceive the two
stimuli as being different.
ln the paired comparison task described
above the experimenter controls the total
time available to the subject for exploring
the properties of the stimuli presented on
both the initial familiarization and sub-
sequent test trials. Another example of an
implicit test that puts the subject in control
of overall stimulus exposure time is the ha-
bituation/ dishabituation procedure. Typi-
cally in this procedure, an animal or child is
first presented during the habituation phase
with an object or stimulus display repeatedly
over successive trials until the recorded
dependent measure of handling time or
gaze habituates. That is, over two consecu-
tive trials it falls to 50% or less of that recor-
ded on the initial two trials. In the experi-
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mental dishabituation condition the animal
or child is next presented with a novel sti-
mulus. ln the control condition, they expe-
rience the original (now habituated) stimu-
lus yet again. Based on a well-documented
preference for novelty exhibited by both
human and non-human primates, we can
predict that the animal or child will attend
significantly longer (i.e., dishabituate) to the
novel stimulus than to the familiar habitua-
ted stimulus if her or she implicitly perceived
the novel object to differ from that presen-
ted during the habituation Phase.
Explicit Judgments of ldentitY
Explicit conceptual knowledge in prelinguis-
tic children and nonhuman primates typically
is inferred from tests of their ability to
transfer an instrumental discriminative
response to novel stimuli that were not used
during acquisition of the task. Explicit
judgments of similarity and difference in
comparative and developmental studies
have been operationalized in a variety of
ways. For example, judgments of physical or
categorical identity can be investigated by
presenting pairs of either identical or
nonidentical items as discriminative stimuli
for differential responding. In such Same/
Different discriminations an animal is rewar-
ded for making one response (e.9., app-
roach) when faced with pairs of like items
and for making an alternative response (e.9.,
avoid) when faced with a pair of unlike
items. ln some cases, an animal may even be
capable of identifying the dimensions of
similarity or difference (e.9., Pepperberg,
1987). An even more complex variation of a
same/different discrimination is the condi-
tional 5/D discrimination task (e.9., Burdyn
& Thomas, 1984). Here responses to pairs of
identical items are reinforced in the presence
of one conditional cue; responses to pairs
of nonidentical items are reinforced in the
presence of an alternative conditional cue.
Physical and categorical identity judg-
ments based on absolute or probabilistic
shared features are often studied using a
nonverbal match-to-sample (MTS) task.
Typically, in a MTS procedure a child or
nonhuman animal is first presented with a
single object or picture (the sample) and
then allowed to choose from several alter-
native comparison stimuli. ln identity MTS
one is rewarded for choosing the alternative
that is physically or categorically identical to
(i.e., matches) the original sample item.
Alternatively, in so-called oddity tasks one
is rewarded for selecting the alternative that
does not match the samPle.
Analogical Judgments of Similarity
As noted above, similarity judgments in a
MTS task can be based solely on physical
identity or the degree of resemblance
between categorical attributes. Tasks like
MTS, however, are useful also for studying
more abstract relational concepts, like
causality and analogies, that cannot be
based on physical or categorical similarities
and differences (Halford, 1992; Oden et al.,
2001) Judgments of analogical similarity - a
hallmark of human reasoning and intelligen-
ce (Spearm an, 1923:5ternberg, 1977) - entail
judgments about the equivalence of higher-
order relational structures and representa-
tions that need not physically resemble one
another (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gos-
wami, 1992; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997).
The ability to make abstract analogical
same/different judgments can be revealed
in a conceptual matching-to-sample task
that entailthe matching of relations. In this
matching problem animals or children are
correct if they match a pair of shoes with a
pair of apples, rather than to a paired eraser
and padlock. Likewise, they are correct if
they match the latter nonidentical pair with
a paired cup and paperweight. In this
example, a subject demonstrates that it
judges the within-pair "ldentity" relation-
ship exemplified by two apples as being the
Same relationship exemplified by paired
shoes. The animal or child similarly demon-
strates that he or she judges the within-pair
relationship of "Nonidentity," illustrated by
the eraser and padlock, as being the Same
as that shown by the nonidentical paired
n
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cup and paperweight. Thus, the conceptual
matching-to-sample task can be conceived
of as a nonlinguistic analogy problem
involving a single abstract relationship of
same or different.
The Tyranny of Words
Recall that the strong interpretation of the
above quotation from Gould proposes that
if one does not have not have a word or
symbolic representation for "something"
then one is perceptually as well as concep-
tually blind to that "something". At first
glance this assumption makes no sense,
except through the myopic lens of a hope-
lessly anthropocentrically focussed view-
finder. There is overwhelming evidence from
both the field and laboratory that non-
linguistic animals parse their world by
features, categories, functional equivalent
classes and relationships (e.9., see Cheney &
Seyfarth, 1990; Thompson, 1995). However,
the position espoused by Gould is more
deserving of attention when one considers
evidence that only those humans and chim-
panzees exposed to a regime of language
or symbolic token training can make ana-
logical judgements about relations between
relations. This more proscribed claim, one
might argue, is more consistent with the
spirit of Gould's statement (House, Brown &
Scott, 1974; Premack 1978; 1983a, 1983b;
Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997). Gillan,
Premack & Woodruff (1981) further demon-
strated that Sarah, a "language trained"
chimpanzee (i.e., trained with discursive
syntactical strings of symbols) who matched
relations also succeeded in completing
partially constructed analogies involving
complex geometric forms and functional
relationships. More recently Oden, Thomp-
son & Premack (2001) further demonstrated
that this same chimpanzee could construct
analogies spontaneously from a randomized
grouping of geometric elements.
One example of chimpanzees without a
history of training with syntactically ordered
symbols who successfully matched objects
but failed to match relations was reported
by Oden, Thompson & Premack (1988, 1990).
In those experiments infant chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) spontaneously judged
objects as being the same or different
following acquisition of a MTS task using
only two training stimuli (Oden et al., 1988).
That is, having first learned to match a lock
with lock and a cup with cup, all 4 subjects
spontaneously transferred their matching
ability under conditions of nondifferential
reward to novel items and objects that in
no way resembled the lock and cup expe-
rienced during training. Hence, the match-
ing capabilities were broadly construed from
the outset. Results from the transfer tests
revealed that during training the animals
learned 
- 
absent any explicit "instruction"
to do so 
- 
to not simply match cup with cup
or lock with lock, but to put "like with like".
These same infant chimpanzees, how-
ever, failed to learn a conceptual MTS task
involving pairs of objects. That is, despite
extensive tra i n i ng, these sym bol -nalve i nfa nt
chimpanzees consistently failed to match
one identity relation (AA) with another
identity relation (BB), and to match a non-
identity relation (CD) with another (EF)
(Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1990). Note
that in this example and for the remainder
of this paper letters (e.9., AA & CD) are used
only for expository purposes to represent
the physical objects or digitized images
employed as stimuli.
The disparity between the infant chim-
panzees' ability to match objects, but not
to match relations was consistent with prior
reports that only those humans and chim-
panzees exposed to a regime of language
or symbolic token training can judge re-
lations as being the same or different
(House, Brown & Scott, 1974;Premack 1978;
1983a, 1983b; Thompson, Oden & Boysen,
1997). These results would seem to offer
good evidence in support of Gould's posi-
tion. That is, the infant chimpanzees failed
the relational MTS task because they lacked
a word or symbol for relational sameness.
But perhaps, but rather because they were
perceptually insensitive to the abstract
relations instantiated by the stimulus pairs.
13
Roger K. R. Thompson, Mary Jo Rattermann & David L Oden: Perception and Judgment of Abstract Same-Dtfferent...
Results from additional experiments by a nonidentity pair, then the within-pair
Oden et al., (1990) provided a test of relation differed acrosstrials.
Lashley's (1929) alternative hypothesis. That Handling time associated with the object
is, perhapsthe infantchimpanzeesfailedthe pair experienced on trial 2 was influenced
relational MTS task not because they lacked by the relation with which an animal was
a word or symbol for relational sameness, familiarized on trial 1. Specifically, the
but rather because they were perceptually second object pair was handled significantly
insensitive to the abstract relations instan- less if the within-pair relation it instantiated
tiated bythestimulus pairs. Using a "familia- was the same as that associated with the
rization/novelty" procedure Oden et al first object pair. lf, however, the relation
(1990) found, lonsistent with Lashley's changed across trials, then there was no sig-
suggestion, but contrary to that of Gould, nificant difference in handling times across
tfraittre very same infant chimpanzees who trials. Difference scores (Tr. 1 minus Tr. 2)
failed the reiational matching task neverthe- derived from these data showed a statis-
less could perceive abstract identity/ non- ticallysignificantmaineffectof whetherthe
identity relationships between pairs of relation on trial 2 was either familiar or
items. novel. These results suggest that infant
The familiarity/novelty procedure used by chimpanzees that spontaneously detected
Oden et al. (1990) was similar to the previo- abstract same/different relations neverthe-
usly described non-instrumental tasks em- less were unable to use this tacit knowledge
ployed in studies of perception and cogni- to judge relations in a relational MTS. Thus,
tive development in humans and nonhuman whatever the reason for the infant chimpan-
primates(Fagan, 1970; Fagan &Singer, 1983; zees' failure to match relations, it did not
bunderson & Sackett, 1984; Gunderson & result from their inability to implicitly detect
Swartz, 1986, Swartz, 1983). - In one expe- such relations.
riment of the Oden et al. (1990) study, infant Interestingly, the disparity between im-
chimpanzees handled a pair of objects plicitly perceiving and explicitly judging
mounted together on a display board for a relations is manifested also by humans.
fixed period,The object pair reflected either Earlier reports claimed that children cannot
the "identity" rela{ion (e.g., two identical judge same/different relations before the
shoes) or the "Nonidentity" relation (e.g., age of about 5 years (Premack, 1983; Daeh-
an eraser paired with a padlock). After the ler et al., 1979) but Tyrrell, Stauffer & Snow-
familiarization trial, the infants were given man (1991), using a paired-comparison
a new pair of physically novel play objects preference-for-novelty test, demonstrated
on triai 2. The new object pair on trial 2 that 7 mo. old infants spontaneously atten-
instantiated either the same relation ded to relational sameness and difference.
(identity or nonidentity) experienced pre- The human infants first gazed at a pair of
viously during the familiarization trial, or it either identical or nonidentical objects for
represented the alternative relationship. The 10 s on a familiarization trial. Subsequently,
within-pair relation across trials remained on trial 2 the infants saw two pairs of novel
the same if an identity pair (e.g., two shoes) objects. One pair consisted of identical ob-
on the familiarization trial was followed on jects; the other pair consisted of noniden-
trial2byanovel identitypair(e.g.,twogolf tical objects. During trial 2 the infants
balls). Likewise, the within-pair relationship looked significantly longer at the object pair
across trials also was familiar (i.e., the same) which instantiated the novel within-pair
if a nonidentical pair (e.g., eraser and cup) relation.
followed another nonidentical pair (e.g., In a procedure similar to that used by
hose-clamp and fork). However, if a non- Oden et al. (1990) Rattermann, Thompson
identical pair on trial 2 followed an identity & Palchuk (in prep) presented 12- to 18-
pair, or an identity pair on trial 2 followed month old infants with an object-handling
14
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task. As with Oden, et al's subjects, these
infants were allowed to handle a set of two
identical (or non-identical, depending upon
trial type) objects until they were habi-
tuated. The investigators then presented
infants with a choice of two sets of two
objects 
- 
one set was an example of the
identity relation and one set was an example






infants preferred to handle the object sets
instantiating the novel relation.
A Profound Disparity
The research described above points to
major between- and within- species dispari-
ties. To summarize: First, both infant chim-
panzees and humans can detect relational
similarity as measured in preference-for-
novelty perceptual tasks, but they cannot
express this tacit knowledge explicitly in
judgmental tasks like MTS. This disparity
raises important questions as to what are the
conditions necessary for the expression of
an otherwise latent capacity in adult
chimpanzees. Perhaps, as Gould's would
propose, they needed a symbolto instantiate
the relation. As noted above, only linguisti-
cally competent humans and 
- 
chimpanzees
trained with syntactically ordered symbols
mastered the relational matching task. An
important unanswered question, then, is
whether experience with syntactically
embedded symbols is the basis for the
emergence of the disparity originally
reported by Premack (Premack & Premack,
1972; Premack, 1 976).
Thompson and Oden (1993) suggested
that perhaps the aspect of language training
which enables chimpanzees to express
instrumentally what they otherwise only
perceive is the provision of concrete tokens
per se associated with abstract relations of
similarity and difference. Results from a
relational matching study by Thompson,
Oden & Boysen, 1997) are consistent with
this viewpoint. Three of the chimpanzees in
this study had been trained previously on a
same/different discrimination task with two
tokens and multiple pairs of objects. For
example, given two like items they learned
to choose a heart-shaped symbol and if
presented with a pair of unlike items they
learned to choose a symbol consisting of a
diagonal bar. The fourth chimpanzee in this
relational matching task was Sarah, the
"language"-trained chimpanzee studied
extensively by David Premack. Sarah res-
ponded correctly on 81 .2o/o of the relational
MTS trials. Likewise, the other three chim-
panzees successfully matched relations at
performance levels of 91o/o, 81o/o, and 84o/o
correct responses. These performance levels
were obtained under conditions in which
the symbols for same and different were
absent and, under conditions of non-
differential reinforcement in which a choice
of either alternative, whether correct or
incorrect, was rewarded. Comparable co-
rrect performance levels were obtained in
a physical MTS task. lmportantly, the
relational matching by all four chimpanzees
appeared spontaneously on the first sti-
mulus set and on two subsequent problems
involving novel object pairs.
These findings were consistent with the
suggestion that the views of Gould and
Lashley are not mutually exclusive. As
suggested by Thompson & Oden (1993) the
prior provision of concrete tokens associated
with abstract relations of identity and
nonidentity enabled the chimpanzees 
-




what they otherwise only implicitly per-
ceived. lf the prior experience with tokens
in a relatively simple same/different task
underlay the ability of these chimpanzees
to match relations then it implies that the
tokens were not simply conditionally
associated with pairs of like and unlike
objects during acquisition of the original
discrimination task, but functioned instead
as symbols for the more abstract relational
concepts of identity and nonidentity (cf.,
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). Thompson et al
(1997) argued that, "Conceptual relational
matching is made possible by the chim-
panzee's representational capacity to re-
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encode abstract relations which are instan-
tiated by physically disparate sample and
alternative pairs, into iconically identical
symbols." (Thompson et al, 1 997, p.42). As
noted above the tokens were not present
during the relational matching task and
hence, Thompson et al, (1997) hypothesized
that the stimulus pairs instantiating the
identity and nonidentity relations evoked
covert representations of their respective
symbols permitting the animals to now
explicitly judge what they otherwise only
implicitly perceived.
Further support for the theoretical view
comes from the data for a fifth chimpanzee
in the Thompson et al. (1997) study. This
individual had received neither syntactical
- 
nor token training failed the relational
MTS task (i.e., 53% correct). He did, how-
ever, match objects on the basis of physical
similarity (7oo/o correct) under conditions of
differential reinforcement.
Interestingly, the same regime of token
training does not enable macaque monkeys
to judge the analogical equivalence of
stimulus pairs (Washburn, Thompson &
Oden, 1997, in prep.). "Symbol-sophisti-
cated" monkeys were trained to choose
"Circle" following an identity pair (AA-O)
and to choose "Triangle" following a non-
identity pair (CD-/-\). Then they genera-
lized this ability to novel identity (BB) and
non identity (EF) stim u lus pa i rs. Nevertheless,
unlike chimpanzees with the same expe-
rience, the monkeys still failed to match AA
with BB and CD with EF. These results
indicated that the same/different tokens
functioned simply as cues conditionally
associated with instances of physical identity
and nonidentity alone. They did not fun-
ction as symbols for the relational concepts
of identity and non-identitY.
Why Should This Be?
Thompson & Oden (1996) demonstrated that
contrary to ape and child; adult macaque
monkeys appear to be perceptually insensi-
tive to analogical equivalencies of a propo-
sitional nature. Adult rhesus macaque mon-
keys do not spontaneously perceive ana-
logical or relational identity. The evidence
suggesting that monkeys do not perceive
relational novelty was obtained originally
using a paired comparison preference for
novelty procedure which was the same as
that used by Tyrrell et al. (1991) - described
above 
- 
to demonstrate that 7-mo-old hu-
man infants were sensitive to such relations.
ln contrast to the 7-mo. human infants
studied by Tyrrell et al (1991) the monkeys
showed no preference for novel relations as
measured by differential looking time on
trial 2. The differences in absolute looking
time recorded for familiar and novel
relations was not statistically significant.
Fifty-two percent of the total looking time
recorded on trial 2 was directed at the object
pair instantiating the novel relation; 48% of
total looking time was directed at the
familiar relation. These percentages did not
differ significantly from the predicted
chance level.
The same monkeys, however, showed a
preference for physical novelty when tested
with the same procedures (e.9., Thompson,
Podos & Scherer, 1990; Hardenbergh, Neff
& Orman, 1991). In all these experiments
absolute looking times directed to familiar
and novel objects on trial 2 differed
significantly. 5ixty percent of the total
looking time recorded on trial 2 was
directed at the physically novel objects; 40%
was directed at the familiar object. These
percentages differed significantly (p < '05;
t-test) from the predicted chance level of
50%. These latter results were comparable
to those reported for infant macaque
monkeys (e.g., Gunderson & Swartz, 1986),
although there was less variance in the data
obtained from the adult monkeys. This
evidence for perceptual sensitivity to
physical but not abstract relational similarity
has been replicated several times, and it is
not affected by such factors as inter-object
distance within pairs, size of stimulus pool,
static versus dynamic presentation of stimuli,
or absolute looking times during either
familiarization or test trials (Thompson,
Arlinksy & Christie, 19921.
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These results strongly suggest that unlike
the human and ape, the monkeys are not
perceptually sensitive to abstract identity/
nonidentity relations, which transcend
physical features. One might argue that this
disparity for the monkey subjects resulted
from the use of junk objects and sensitivity
to relations may have been revealed had the
stimuli been drawn from other stimulus
domains. Perhaps, but if so it would imply
an additional constraint not demanded of
either child or chimpanzee.
Results obtained from infant macaques
further indicate that these results are not
simply a function of age (Maninger, Gun-
derson, & Thompson, 1997). Like the adult
macaques, 7-week-old pigtailed macaque
infants, in contrast to their human counter-
parts, fail to recognize abstract relations on
a visual paired-comparison measure. This
was the first study using the familiarity-
novelty paradigm in Gunderson's laboratory
that showed a discontinuity in perceptual-
cognitive development between macaque
and human infants (Grant-Webster, Gun-
derson & Burbacher, 1990; Gunderson, Rose
& Grant-Webster, '1990; Sackett, Gunderson
& Baldwin, 1982). The infant monkeys'
failure to spontaneously detect abstract
same/different is consistent with the results
obtained from adult and aged rhesus
monkeys by Thompson and his colleagues
(see above) and point, therefore, to a
profound disparity in the abstract repre-
sentational capacities of old-world monkeys
on the one hand, and apes and humans on
the other.
Thus far, this disparity holds true regard-
less of the task (paired-comparison & habi-
tuation/dishabituation) and hence time
available for information processing, or
whether visual gaze or object handling is the
dependent measure (Chaudhri, Ghazi,
Thompson & Oden, 1997; Thompson, 1995;
Thompson & Oden, 1996; Thompson, Oden,
Boyer, Coleman, & Hill, 1997). Nevertheless,
regardless of the dependent measure, the
same animals give every indication that they
perceive objects to be the same or different
based on physical properties alone.
lf Lashley is correct, then the overall
pattern of results from the implicit percep-
tual studies with macaque monkeys suggests
that the circle and triangle tokens in the
experiments conducted by Washburn et al
(1997) could not acquire symbolic meaning
as they did for chimpanzees (e.9., Thompson
et al., 1997).Instead the circle and triangle
token were restricted to function for the
monkeys simply as choice alternatives
signaled by the preceding physical equi-
valence judgment that 'A is A' or 'C is not
D'. This interpretation of token function
implies that although monkeys might learn
to use tokens as conditional cues, the fun-
ctional meaning of such cues would not
transcend the specific stimulus dimensions
trained, even though transfer to novel
exemplars within that dimension might be
expected.




As noted above prelinguistic human infants
as young as 7 mo. of age (Tyrrell et al., 1991)
are similar to infant chimpanzees, and unlike
adult or infant monkeys, in that they too
implicitly perceive abstract relations of
sameness and difference. Extrapolating from
the results collected from the nonhuman
primates one might reason then that the
human infants' capacity to explicitly judge
high order relations would similarly be
facilitated by explicit symbol training.
Evidence supporting this prediction has been
reported by Rattermann and her colleagues
(Rattermann & Gentner, 1990; Rattermann,
Gentner and Deloache, in preparation).
In one such study children were pre-
sented with two configurations of objects,
each arranged according to the relation of
monotonic increase in size relation. Mono-
tonic increase was operationalized as three
objects in a row increasing in height from
left to right, or right to left. One set of
objects was designated as the child's set, the
other as the experimenter's set. The child
was asked to close his eyes while the expe-
rimenter hid a sticker under one of the
n
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objects in is set, Then the child opened his In a further study, Rattermann and Gen-
eyis and watched as the experimenter tner again gave children the cross-mapping
piaced a sticker under one of the objects in task, but this time they gave them labels for
i.rerset.Thechildwastoldthatif hewatched the higher-order relational pattern of mo-
carefully he could figure out where the notonic increase. Inthe previousstudysome
sticker was hidden in his set. The child was children had spontaneously applied the
then allowed to choose one of the objects labels "Daddy, Mommy, Baby" to the
in his set. The rule was always the same: the objects (see also Smith, 1989). Since these
child's sticker was hidden under whichever terms seemed to apply to the monotonic
object was playing the same relational role increase pattern, in this next study 3-year-
in his set as the object with the sticker was olds were to use these labels. They were
in the experimenter's set (that is, the object given "families" in which the largest object
with the same relative size and position: was labeled "Daddy", the middle, "Mom-
e.g., the largest object in both sets). lf the my" and the smallest, "Baby". The children
chlld found the sticker on the first attempt, received explicit training trials with labeled
he was allowed to keep it. lf not, he was families of penguins and bears: e.9., the
shown where it was but was not allowed to experimenter said, "This is my Daddy, this is
keep it. my Mommy and this is my Baby (pointing).
Within this basic task the richness/com- This is your Daddy, this is your Mommy and
plexity of the objects (rich vs. sparse) were this is your Baby. lf my sticker is under my
manipulated. Richness was manipulated by Daddy, then your sticker is under your
using either sparse objects, such as clay pots Daddy." Then the children were tested on
and blue plastic boxes, or rich objects, such the same stimuli- boxes and baskets in the
as a pot of brightly colored silk flowers, a sparse condition and houses, cars, etc. in the
toy house, a colorful mug and a toy car. rich condition 
- 
as in the first experiment.
Children were presented with cross-mapp- The question in this experiment was whe-
ings in which the object similarities sugges- ther the family labels would increase chil-
ted different correspondences than the dren's ability to appreciate the higher-order
relational mapping. Using a between- pattern by inviting them to import a familiar
subjects design, 3- and 4-year-olds were relational schema. lf so, this should make the
tested in the two richness conditions. relational choice more salient.
Children found this task quite difficult; The results of the labeling manipulation
both 3- and 4-year-old children had diffi- werequitedramatic:the performanceof the
culty producing relational responses and the 3-year-olds improved to a level comparable
difficulty was greater for rich stimuli (32o/o to that of S-year-olds with both the sparse
and 38% relational responses, respectively, (89% relational responding) and rich (79%
neither above chance) than for sparse relational responding) stimuli. Comparing
stimuli (54o/oand62%).Theresultsbearout these results with their performance in
the prediction that children should have Experiment 1 (54o/o and 32o/o correct, res-
trouble focusing on the matching relational pectively), it is as though the children gained
structure in the face of competing object two years of insight!
similarities. This conclusion is reinforced by One concern is that this impressive per-
the finding that children selected the iden- formance depended on maintaining an
tical object (rather than the object playing artificially high level of explicit labeling.
the same relational role) more often for the However, in a subsequent study it was found
rich stimuli (42o/o for the 3-year-olds,32o/o that 3-year-olds given the label training
for the 4-year-olds) than for the sparse could successfully transfer to new stimuli,
stimuli (23%for the 3-year-olds,23o/o forthe which they had to arrange for themselves.
4-year-olds). Although this transfer task was conducted
with no further use of labels by the experi-
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menter, children who had received the label
training did very well. Of the 3-year-olds
who had received training, 81% reached
criterion with the sparse stimuli and 50%
with the rich stimuli, as compared with the
control (no training) group, of which 50%
reached criterion with sparse stimuli and
12o/o with rich stimuli. This research suggests
that, symbols can be used as tools for
extracting and formulating abstraction. In
this sense, the acquisition of relational terms
and systems is instrumental in the develop-
ment of abstract thought (Gentner &
Rattermann, 1991; see also Nelson, 1996).
Are Symbols the Only Way to Rela-
tional Knowledge?
The research we have reviewed here strongly
implies that language or symbol training
does not instill prepositional knowledge
about higher order abstract relations of the
type described above, but it does appear
necessary for the explicit expression of such
knowledge in equivalence judgment tasks.
The implication then is that experience with
external symbol structures and experience
using them transforms the shape of the
computational spaces that must be negotia-
ted in order to solve certain kinds of abstract
problems. This finding dovetails with the
independent demonstration by Clark and
Thornton (1997) that standard connectionist
learning by artificial intelligent systems fail
in exactly the same class of tasks used with
the child and chimpanzee unless the net is
provided with some external guidance to
simplify its representational complexity.
The provision of such 'external guidance'
via symbol training with tokens does not
enable macaque monkeys to judge the
analogical equivalence of stimulus pairs.
Are Symbols Necessary or
Sufficient?
The argument thus far is that experience
with symbols are necessary and sufficient for
the expression of otherwise implicit abstract
conceptual knowledge. But perhaps they are
simply suff icient and not necessary for
explicit conceptually driven judgments of
equivalence. Thompson and Oden (2000)
cited two brief reports of possible con-
ceptual-relational matching in symbol-naTve
chimpanzees 
- 
albeit only after literally
thousands of trials in what Premack (1988)
aptly labeled "dogged training" (Smith,
King, Witt, & Rickel, 1975; Premack (1988).
Unfortunately, the limited details available
in these brief reports seriously constrain
their comparative interpretation across
studies. lmportantly, however, the efficacy
of these "dogged training" procedures was
apparently limited relative to that of symbol
training which in the study by Thompson et
al (1997), for example, was sufficient for the
chimpanzees to match relations immediately
in the absence of explicit training and diffe-
rential reinforcement.
Research in the Cognitive Development
Laboratory at Franklin and Marshall College
with children provided additional support
for the view that experience with symbols
is sufficient but not necessary for the
acquisition of a relational matching task. ln
an ongoing study, Rattermann, Thompson
and Lehmann are testing 18- 24-month old
infant's ability to perform a relational
matching to sample task, with and without
token training. Human infants were first
given a simple relational matching to sample
task using the relations of identity and non-
identity and received reinforcement regard-
less of their response. For three days after
completing the RMTS pre-test, one group of
infants was given a simple token training
task in which examples of identity and non-
identity were shown to the infants and they
were asked to choose the appropriate token
to reflect each relation. The children were
given differential feedback on each trail.
Another control group of infants was only
allowed to play with the tokens and the
examples of identity and non-identity but
were not asked to choose nor given any
feedback. The infants were then tested
again, using the RMTS task with non-
differential reinforcement. The hypothesis
was that the token trained infants would
1g
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show greater improvement in the RMTS
post-test than the non-token trained in-
fants. This was not, however, what was
found. The performance of both groups of
infants increased, becoming significantly
different from chance, but not significantly
different from each other. lmportantly, in
the case of these children, the improvement
in performance, unlike that of the chimpan-
zees, occurred relatively quickly as opposed
to thousands of differential reinforced
training trials.
Conclusions
We began this paper with two quotes, one
from Gould suggesting that symbols drive
awareness, and another from Lashley
suggesting that symbols can only be applied
where awareness already exists. We propose
a middle ground; symbols (including lan-
guage) are powerfultoolsthat aid in making
explicit that which was previously implicit.
We have shown that infants, both human
and chimpanzee, are aware of the relations
of identity and non-identity, and that this
implicit awareness can be made explicit by
the use of symbols and tokens.
5o does this mean that words and sym-
bols are both necessary and sufficient for the
acquisition of relational competence? We
propose that symbols alone are certainly not
sufficient. As Lashley would argue, and the
data from human and chimp infants sup-
port, some species quickly show the ability
to perceive relations and relational simila-
rity. This ability forms the basis for later
abilities to form relational abstractions.
Without this basic ability, all the symbols in
the world would not enable an individual
to notice and use relations and relational
similarity, as was seen in the data from the
experiments by Washburn et al., (1997).
Are symbols the only tool at an animal's
disposal? Evidence from human infants and
primates suggests that abstraction through
dogged training or simply through many
exposures to a relation are also effective.
The results from the children and the results
of "dogged training" with chimpanzees
suggest that the use of symbols may not be
the only road to relational competence 
-instead, multiple presentations of a common
relation (i.e., identity) may lead to the
spontaneous abstraction of that relation. ln
the research with children, for example,
both the token-trained and the non-token
trained children interacted with examples of
identity and non-identity over three diffe-
rent training sessions. lt is possible that this
experience led them to align the objects and
compare the common features present. In
this way, an infant could come to have
explicit knowledge of identity, which he or
she could then carry over to the relational-
match ing-to-samPle task.
What then are the advantages of sym-
bols? Thompson et al, (1997) concluded that
prior symbol training with tokens reduces
relational matching to a task that is func-
tionally equivalent to physical matching (see
also Thompson & Oden, 2000). As Kluver
suggested in the 1930s the token or symbolic
tag "objectifies" a relationship per se
independently of any particular exemplar
(1933/1961). These notions were reiterated
recently by Andy Clark (1998, 2001) who
speculated, as had Thompson et al (1997)
previously, that, "Learning a set of tags and
labels (which we all do when we learn a
language) is...closely akin to acquiring a
new perceptual modality. For like a per-
ceptual modality it renders certain features
of our world concrete and salient, and
allows us to target our thoughts (and
learning algorithms) on a new domain of
basic objects (emphasis added)...These
simple objects can then be attended to in
ways that quickly reveal (emphasis added)
further (otherwise hidden) patterns, as in
the case of relations between relations."
(Clark, 2001, p. 145).
Thus, as we proposed at the outset, the
interaction between implicit and explicit, is
one that indeed benefits from the use of
symbols, but this relationship is less of a
tyranny and more that of a catalyst for what
becomes an open ended reiterative process.
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PERCEPCIJA I PROSUDIVANJE APSTRAKTNIH ODNOSA
MAJMUMA I DJECE: CINE LI SIMBOLI EKSPLICITIM
SAMO ONO 5TO JE IMPLICITNO?
SAZETAK
Novija istraZivanja pojmovnih sposobnosti primata ukazuju na temeljnu razliku izmedu majmuna s jedne strane
te tovjekolikih majmuna i dovjeka s druge (Thomson i Oden, u tisku). U cjelini uzevii, rezultati govore da bi se
majmuni, ali ne i tovjekoliki majmuni i tovjek, mogli smatrati "paleologiiarima" po tome 5to stvaraju pojam
klasa na temelju istovjetnih obiljezja. Za razlikovanje apstraktnijih odnosa obicno su potrebne razmjerno
jednostavne proceduralne strategije koje olaksavaju asocijativni procesi Sto su najvjerojatnije zajednitki svim
sisavcima. Nema sigurnih dokaza da majmuni mogu percipirati odnose medu odnosima, a kamo li ih ocijeniti
istovjetnima. Dosad je ta pojmovna sposobnost analogijskog zakljucivanja pronadena samo kod timpanza i
covjeka.
Zanimfjivo je da "analogijski (ovjekoliki majmun", poput djeteta, svoje anlalogijsko znanje moae izraziti samo
ako je prvo usvojio jezik ili sustav znakova kojim se mogu enkodirati i manipulirati propozicijske reprezentacije
(primjerice, Premack, 1983; Rattermann i Gentner, 1988; Thomson i Oden, 1993, 1996; Thomson, Oden i Boysen,
'1997; Tyrrell, Stauffer i Snowman, 1991).
Jezicno naivne iimpanze i djeca u predlingvistickoj fazi primje(uju odnose (istovjetnosti ili neistovjetnosti) kao
jednake ili razliCite bilo da ih ocjenjuju pogledom ili manipulacijom predmeta u zadacima u kojima se prioritet
daje novini, kao Jto su 'usporedivanja u paru' i 'privikavanje/odvikavanje'. Medutim, zanimljivo je da oni ljudi
JEDNAKOG I RAZLIE OC U MAJMUNA, EOVIEKOLIKIH
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i timpanze koji ute jezitni sustav ili simbolitke znakove mogu apstraktne odnose medu odnosima prociieniti
kao jednake ilirazliCite (usporedi House, Brown i Scott 1974; Premack 1983; Sidman, 1994; Thomson i suradnici,
tggi). fa sposobnost piocienjivanja vidljiva je u pojmovnim zadacima uparivanja s uzorkom. U tom problemu
timpanza iii Ailete utinit (e isiravno upari ti par cipela s dviie iabuke, a ne ako 9a upari s kombinaciiom gumice
i lokota. Slitno tome, utinit (e ispravno upare li ovaj neistovjetan par s kombinacijom Salice i dr2ata za papir.
pojmovni zadatak uparivanja s uzorkom mozemo smatrati nelingvistitkim problemom analogiie koii ukliutuiejejan apstraktni od'nos jedhakog ili razlititog. Prije nego tto su izlo2eni iezitnom sustavu ili analogiiskom
sustavu simbolitkih rn"lioua i tluai i cimpanz- ne uspijevaju uparitidva odnosa istovietnosti niti dva odnosa
neistovjetnosti (Oden, Thompson i Premack, 1990; Tyrrell, Zingaro i Minard, 1993).
ovi rezultati navode na zakljutak da utenje jezika ili simbola ne usaduje poznavanie apstraktnih odnosa poput
gore opisanih, ali znatajno olakiava oivoreno iskazivanie takvog poznavania te.snal_a2enie u zadacima
f,roclenlivanja istovjetnoiti. tu se zatim name(e zakliu(ak da iskustvo s vaniskim simbolitkim strukturama te
isruiw6 u nithovol primjeni zahtijeva izvjesnu prilagodbu kako bi se riietili nekiapstraktni problemi. ova se
spoznaia u iotpunosti poklapa s onim gio su neovisno o tome pokazali Clark i Thornton (19971, a to ie da
uobitajeno ionekcionisiitko utenje pomocu sustava umietne inteligenciie niie uspiesno u istoi vrsti zadataka
ioja se prlmjenjuje kod djece i timpanzi odm ako se u mreZu ne daiu neke upute izvana kako bi se poiednostavnila
slozenost pieo6cizui. usirkos upotrebitakvih'vanjskih sredstava'preko utenia simbola pomocu znakova, odrasli
makaki milmuni 
-.a ra.liku oJ ti.p"n.e ili djeteta - ne uspijevaiu prociieniti analogiisku istovietnost odnosa
parova unitot to1ne ito su bili uspjeini pri upirivanju fizitki istovietnah predmeta (Washburn, Thomson i Oden,
iSSZ; rukopis u pripremi). Zafto jL tome tako? Za razliku od toviekolikog majmuna i dieteta. odrasli i mladi
matafi r"lruni koje se testiralo istim postupcima davanja prioriteta novome, perceptivno su neosietliivi na
apstrakne istovjetnosti analogijske, pa tako i, propoziciiske prirode-(Thomson i Oden, u tisku)
Ovi rezultati komparativnih istraZivanja navode na zaklju(ak da riieti i simbolitki znakovi omogu(uiu
predod2beno rekodiranje apstraktnih poimovnih odnosa te ih (ine konkretnima i lako uotljivima. Na tai natin
,irUoli djetetu i cimpanzi omogu(uju di si na eksplicitan naffn predote implicitno zapazene osobine niihova
svijeta kjo konkretne slike. Oilete lii timpanza potom se mogu sluzititim slikama kako bi doniieli eksplicitne
poi1noun" prosudbe o odnosima koje su, za razliku od majmuna, raniie percipirali samo na implicitan natin.
22
